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A Puzzle for International Law: 
NGOs at the United Nations 
 
Abstract 
A challenge for contemporary international lawyers is the democratic deficit in the United 
Nations. One suggestion that has been used to address this deficit is the introduction of 
NGOs into the decision-making processes. This article seeks to address whether this 
‘inclusion’ is democratic. Once the progressive history of liberal democracy in international 
law is contested, alternative models and standards of democracy can be and have been 
expected of NGOs. Rather than seeking to suggest which model is desirable, it is the aim of 
this article to explore the way in which the current procedures for granting consultative 
status to NGOs manage the tensions between functionalism, internal and external 
accountability, participatory and representative democracy. In January 2014, the United 
Nations Committee for NGOs decided on the consultative status of over 400 NGOs. Whilst 
the terms of reference for the Committee refers to the democratic status of the NGOs and 
their accountability mechanisms, the questions permitted by states at the Committee reflect 
states’ concerns with the ‘interests’ NGOs represent rather than their internal governance 
structures. Using these decisions from the Committee, it will be shown how the Committee 
manages the tension by leaning in favour of representation and expertise at the expense of 
accountability. 
 
1. Introduction 
On 25
th
 March 2014, a number of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) stood up in The 
Human Rights and Alliance of Civilizations Room, in Palais des Nations, holding photos or 
hand drawn pictures of human rights defender Cao Shunli. It was the Universal Periodic 
Review of China at the United Nations Human Rights Council, and the NGO, International 
Service for Human Rights (ISHR) had just made a statement, at the end of which a minute’s 
silence was called for to mark the death of Cao Shunli. Shunli had been detained by the 
Chinese authorities in September 2013 for protesting against the refusal to allow the public to 
participate in a national human rights review.
1
 China reacted, interrupting ISHR’s statement, 
to highlight that a minute’s silence went beyond what an NGO could contribute to 
discussions. The President moved onto the next NGO statement, ISHR and the NGOs that 
joined them were ‘silenced’.  
 
The stifling of NGOs at the United Nations Human Rights Council raises concerns about the 
undemocratic nature of the United Nations (UN). The participation of NGOs in international 
decision-making was supposed to mitigate against the democratic deficit. This instance also 
raises concerns about the relations between states and civil society at the UN.  The history of 
participation by NGOs at the UN highlights a tensional relationship between state and non-
state actors, but it is the procedures for access to the UN bodies that is at the crux of this 
problematic relationship. Access to the United Nations is predominantly managed through the 
UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolution 1996/31. Although other 
specialized bodies have their own procedures, the consultative status granted by ECOSOC is 
the main mechanism. ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 outlined criteria that the United Nations 
Committee on NGOs should take into account when considering applications from NGOs. 
                                                          
1
 Jonathan Kaiman, ‘Chinese activist Cao Shunli dies after being denied medical help, says 
website’ The Guardian (14 March 2014) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/14/china-activist-cao-shunli-dies-human-
rights> accessed 23
 
April 2014. 
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This includes, the prioritisation of representation from developing countries and those 
countries that have transitional economies,
2
 as well as providing that NGOs should have a 
representative structure, possess accountability mechanisms, and they should exercise voting 
or other appropriate democratic and transparent decision-making processes.
3
 Consultative 
status is divided into general status and special status, with a roster for those NGOs that are 
considered useful.
4
 Broadly speaking, general status grants more participatory rights than 
special status, as NGOs with general consultative status are able to submit an increased 
amount of material.
5
 General status is reserved for those NGOs that are ‘international’ or are 
more widely representative.
6
 These criteria or principles highlight the puzzle for international 
law. Tensions between internal and external accountability, representation and participation 
and expertise underpin the language of Resolution 1996/31. The Preamble to Resolution 
1996/31 shows the balance that it is attempting to strike between representation and expertise. 
It acknowledges the democratic pluralism of the ‘full diversity’ of NGOs, whilst also paying 
heed to the ‘breadth of expertise’.7 Thought carefully balanced in the text of the resolution, 
there is much overlap between these themes, such as the UN Committee on NGOs is able to 
prioritise representation over participation.  
 
The problem of reconciling these tensions has not gone unaddressed in the scholarship. In 
2006, Peter Willetts analysed the approach taken in the Cardoso Report on the UN and Civil 
Society. He argued that the report attempts to combine three irreconcilable frameworks; 
functionalism, neocorporatism, and democratic pluralism. If, he suggests, functionalism and 
neocorporatism are focused on expertise (and expertise within the government), then 
democratic pluralism which is premised on the diversity of participants,
8
 is not possible. This 
“confused” approach and the panels ignorance of the current ECOSOC procedures,9 means 
that the Cardoso reforms to the ECOSOC procedure are weak. Willetts criticises the report 
for overlooking the current ECOSOC procedures, but he does not acknowledge that those 
procedures are manifestations of a similarly confused and combined framework. It is the aim 
of this article to show the tension, first at the superficial level, between functionalism and 
democratic pluralism in the ECOSOC procedures. Secondly, the tension is much deeper 
because democratic pluralism has to be unpacked, namely what form or ‘model’ this 
democratic pluralism takes. Maria Ludovica Murazzani suggests that democratic pluralist 
approaches bring about ‘transparency, participation and accountability’, but she does not note 
the tension between these.
10
 Analysing the criteria for ECOSOC and the meetings, there are a 
further three tensions between accountability, representative democracy and participatory 
democracy. These tensions sit at the heart of the debate on the democratic credibility of non-
state actors. 
 
                                                          
2
 ECOSOC ‘Consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental 
organizations’ Resolution 1996/31 (25 July 1996), para 6. 
3
 ibid para 12. 
4
 ibid paras 22, 23, 24. 
5
 ibid para 31. 
6
 ibid para 22. 
7
 ibid Preamble 
8
 Peter Willetts, ‘The Cardoso Report on the UN and Civil Society: Functionalism, Global 
Corporatism, or Global Democracy?’ (2006) 12 Global Governance 305, 317. 
9
 ibid 306. 
10
 Maria Ludovica Murazzani, ‘NGOs, Global Governance and the UN: NGOs as “Guardians 
of the Reform of the International System”’ (2009) 16 Transit Stud Rev 501, 506. 
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This article is separated into three sections. Firstly, the role of NGOs at the United Nations 
will be outlined. The increasing influence of NGOs in international decision-making raises 
concerns about the democratic nature of NGOs and the possible threat to democracy from the 
inclusion of NGOs. Secondly, the question of democracy is addressed. Challenging the 
dominant narrative of liberal democracy in international law, the particularities of NGOs 
allows for discussion of alternative models. The approach to democracy and NGOs has 
predominately centred on four themes; expertise, accountability, participation and 
representation. These four themes are in a tensional relationship, the overlaps will be 
analysed to show the questions that a procedure managing access to the United Nations, such 
as the ECOSOC Resolution, would need to address. Thirdly, using the ECOSOC procedures 
and the decisions from the United Nations Committee on NGOs, the approach of states to 
NGOs will be explored. Taking in turn the four theoretical themes that give rise to tension, 
the criteria and the questions put to applicant NGOs will be discussed. Ultimately, the 
Committee on NGOs leans towards prioritising questions of representation because then the 
states can control what issues, persons and peoples are represented.  
 
2. The United Nations, Civil Society and Nongovernmental Organisations  
Before discussing the role of civil society and NGOs at the UN, it is beneficial to outline the 
debates on the meaning of civil society and NGOs. The contested meanings of the terms lead 
into a debate on the contested role of these non-state actors at the UN. From awareness-
raising to standard setting, the roles of NGOs at the UN are varied. Analysing ECOSOC 
Resolution 1996/31 shows how the plethora of diverging roles have been managed to balance 
both expertise and participation. Looking at the documentation on the meeting of the UN 
Committee on NGOs, the balance of these roles is different, as the Committee are seen to 
favour particular interests or ‘expertise’.  
 
The meaning and contents of civil society is contested. At its broadest, it might mean ‘a 
sphere of social life that is public but excludes government activities’.11 Missoni has noted 
that rather than speak of the more formal NGOs, United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the World Bank have shown their ‘desire to engage with a wider range of 
groups’ by using the vocabulary of civil society.12 Despite the shift in some international 
organisations to talk of their relations with civil society,
13
 the majority of civil society 
participants at the UN are NGOs and the ECOSOC accreditation procedures that will be 
discussed in detail later, are geared towards the access of NGOs.  
 
What is meant by an NGO (as opposed to civil society more broadly, or social movements), 
is not initially clear either.
14
 The UN Charter defines NGOs in the negative, as ‘not 
                                                          
11
 Errol Meidinger, ‘Law Making by Global Civil Society: The Forest Certification 
Prototype’  (Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy, State University of New York, 2001) 
cited in Barbara Gemmill and Abimbola Bamidele-Izu, ‘The Role of NGOs and Civil Society 
in Global Environmental Governance’, 4 
<http://environment.research.yale.edu/documents/downloads/a-g/gemmill.pdf > accessed 23 
April 2014. 
12
 Eduardo Missoni, ‘International Non-Governmental Organisations’ in Eduardo Missoni 
and Daniele Alesani (eds), Management of International Institutions and NGOs: 
Frameworks, practices and challenges (Routledge 2013) 53. 
13
 ibid 53. 
14
 See,Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below; Development, social 
movements and third world resistance (CUP 2003). 
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governmental organizations’.15 Whilst this does allow for a broad scope of organisations, 
Dianne Otto has noted that this puts NGOs at the peripheries in international law.
16
 Paragraph 
18 of ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 refers to Article 71 of the UN Charter and confirms that 
the nature of participation of organisations is more limited than the participation of states. In 
fact, Otto has shown that Article 71 ‘limited the earlier practices by confining mandated 
consultation to the areas covered by ECOSOC’.17 These provisions confirm that states are the 
primary actors, and the role of NGOs is secondary. Such exclusion, even in the definition, 
runs throughout the relationship between NGOs and states.  
 
Despite this secondary position, NGOs play an important role in decision-making at the 
international level. Initially in 1946 there were 41 NGOs, but these numbers grew. There was 
a dramatic increase in the 1990s and there are currently over 3,910 NGOs that have ECOSOC 
consultative status at the UN. Missoni notes that since the 1970s NGO participation at the UN 
has extended beyond ECOSOC.
18
 Against this lineal history of progress, Thomas Davies in 
his recent history of NGOs exposes the non-lineal, cyclical, history of the rise of NGOs in 
international institutions. With peaks in the 1930s and the 1990s, rather than a gradual 
increase, the inclusion of NGOs has not been a steady process. Focusing on numbers, 
however, overlooks the actual activity of these NGOs.  
 
There has been a shift in the role played by NGOs, which is reflected in the rhetoric used to 
describe the relationship between the UN and NGOs. Whereas initially NGOs had 
‘consultative status’, there is a shift in favour of discussing the ‘partnership’ with NGOs.19 
Willetts notes that the ‘term consultative status was deliberately chosen to indicate a 
secondary role’.20 Coupled with the negative definition of NGOs, that places them on the 
peripheries, this secondary role reinforces the state-centric nature of international law. 
Consultation evoked advice giving, rather than the NGOs being part of the decision-making 
process.
21
 Placing NGOs in partnership with states invokes equality,
22
 yet the places that 
NGOs are acting and the procedures for accreditation suggest that there non-state actors are 
not equal. 
 
Taking part in ‘informal mechanisms such as lobbying and other political processes’,23 NGOs 
are able to have influence on states. For Christine Chinkin et al, this lobbying role played by 
non-state actors is minimal,
24
 but for C. Tinker these are ‘real contributions of “non state” 
groups to the process of international law making’.25 The size or importance of the role 
                                                          
15
 Dianne Otto, ‘NGOs in the UN System: The Emerging Role of International Civil Society’ 
(1996) 18(1) HRQ 107. 
16
 ibid 110.  
17
 Otto, ‘NGOs in the UN System’ (n 15) 109. 
18
 Missoni (n 12) 64. 
19
 Peter Willetts, ‘From “Consultative Arrangements” to “Partnership”: The Changing Status 
of NGOs in Diplomacy at the United Nations’ (2000) 6 Global Governance 191. 
20
 ibid 191. 
21
 ibid. 
22
 Willletts, ‘From “Consultative Arrangements” to “Partnership”’ (n 19) 192. 
23
 Christine Chinkin, Dianne Otto, John Jackson, Mark Janis and Virginia Leary, ‘Wrap-Up: 
Non-state actors and their influence on international law’ (1998) ASIL 380. 
24
 ibid. 
25
 C Tinker, ‘The Role of non-state actors in international law-making during the UN decade 
of international law’ (1995) 89 American Society of International Law 177, 179. 
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played by NGOs is determined by the approach to international law. Whereas, Gunther 
Teubner has a broader understanding of law making, and notes that agreements take place 
between ‘semi-public, quasi-private or private actors’,26 for commentators that have a state-
centric understanding of international law, non-state actor involvement is secondary. 
Nevertheless, this debate on the size of the role of non-state actors is suggestive at least, of a 
function for NGOs.  
 
At the UN Human Rights Council, NGOs can attend and observe proceedings at the Council, 
submit written statements and make oral interventions, and organise events alongside Council 
Sessions.
27
 More importantly for the purposes of facilitating democracy at the UN and for the 
purpose of ensuring the robust protection of human rights, NGOs can participate in debates, 
interactive dialogues, panel discussions and informal meetings. NGOs working with the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) had involvement with standard-setting, Erik 
Bluemel shows the example of the ILO Minimum Age Convention No. 38.
28
 Bluemel also 
shows that NGOs involved in working against climate change can help supervise and 
implement the Convention; Article 7(2)(a) of the UNFCCC provides that NGOs may contract 
with the Conference of the Parties, where appropriate, to supervise and implement the 
Convention.
29
 Many bodies allow NGOs to ‘act as enforcement agents’ who can inform of 
non-conforming states.
30
  
 
Whilst NGOs have functions as diverse as agenda-setting, norm-setting and enforcement,
31
 
looking at the places NGOs are found highlights their peripheral status. NGOs at the Human 
Rights Council are often found in side panels that they organise. For example, the World 
Federation of UN Associations (WFUNA), which is within the framework of the NGO 
Committee on Human Rights held a side panel at the 23
rd
 Human Rights Council Session, to 
share concrete advice on how NGOs can engage effectively with the Human Rights 
Council.
32
 Observational research from the Human Rights Council shows that NGOs are 
often paid less attention than state delegates; delegates go to the back of the room or use their 
phones.
33
 This approach to NGOs that side-lines their participation, has an impact on the 
extent to which NGOs can be said to play a part in the democratisation of international 
organisations. 
 
                                                          
26
 Gunther Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-centred Constitutional 
Theory’ (Storrs Lectures 2003/2004 Yale Law School, 2004) 13 < http://www.jura.uni-
frankfurt.de/42852793/societal_constitutionalism.pdf > accessed 23 April 2014. 
27
 UNGA Res. 60/251, ‘Human Rights Council’, 15 March 2006, UN Doc. A/RES/60/251, 
para 11. 
28
 Erik  B Bluemel, ‘Overcoming NGO Accountability concerns in International Governance’ 
(2005) 31 Brooklyn J Intl L 139, 169. 
29
 ibid 167. 
30
 ibid 177. 
31
 ibid 162-164, 175. 
32
 WFUNA, ‘Side Event to 23rd Session of the Human Rights Council: Introduction to the 
Human Rights Council’ <http://www.wfuna.org/side-event-to-23rd-session-of-the-human-
rights-council-introduction-to-the-human-rights-council> accessed 23 April 2013. 
33
 Rosa Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early 
Assessment (Routledge 2013) 113-114. 
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2.1 NGOs and Democracy 
 
The way in which NGOs are defined or described has an impact on the role they are seen to 
play at the UN. At times NGOs are described as ‘represent[ing] a global polity’ and are 
included in ‘deliberative processes as a way of overcoming what might otherwise be deemed 
a “democratic deficit”’.34 Some argue that NGOs facilitate ‘more direct citizen 
participation’.35 These conceptualisations invoke the role NGOs play in representative or 
participatory democracy.  At other times ‘NGOs are more appropriately seen as interest 
groups focused on specific issues [rather] than as representatives of bottom-up 
constituencies’.36 In contrast to the representative or participatory role played by NGOs, this 
conceptualisation favours the ‘expertise’ of the NGO. The debate between whether NGOs are 
facilitators of democracy or experts creates a tension that runs throughout the ECOSOC 
resolution and the approach by the UN Committee on NGOs.  
 
If, however, NGOs are solely to provide representation and participation in an attempt to 
generate democratic practices at the UN, they do not always meet expectations. The 
‘paradox’ of the NGOs in international governance is that whilst on the one hand they are 
seen as a tool for democratisation, on the other their lack of accountability and transparency 
undermines their democratic credentials.
37
 The involvement of NGOs can be either a sign of 
health or an ‘indicator of its anti-democratic nature’.38 Some organisations operate without a 
public mandate,
39
 others are overrepresented at the international level, to the detriment of 
more vulnerable voices.
40
 There is a concern that the inclusion of NGOs is elitist, as it is the 
well-funded and better organised groups that can participate.
41
 Despite Thomas Davies in his 
history of transnational NGOs showing that there are both Eastern and Western 
organisations,
42
 there has been a western bias at the United Nations. These criticisms raise 
concerns about the internal accountability mechanisms of NGOs, as well as, the 
representative nature of the organisations individually and as a group. Internal accountability 
and representation are questions that the Committee have to ask of applicant NGOs. The way 
the Resolution and the Committee deal with these questions is discussed in Section 4.  
 
                                                          
34
 Peter L Lindseth, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of 
Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community’ (1999) 99(3) Columbia Law 
Review 628. 
35
 Magdalena Bexell, Jonas Tallberg and Anders Uhlin, ‘Democracy in Global Governance: 
The promises and pitfalls of transnational actors’ (2010) 16 Global Governance 81-101, 82. 
36
 Kenneth Anderson, ‘The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, The Role of 
International Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society’ 
(2000) 11(1) European Journal of International Law 91 cited in Paul Schiff Berman, ‘From 
International Law to Law and Globalization’ (2005) 43 Colum J Transnatl  L 485, 548. 
37
 Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, ‘The NGO Paradox: Democratic Goals and Non-
democratic Outcomes in Kazakhstan’ (1999) 51(7) Europe-Asia Studies 1267-1284. 
38
 See Kal Raustiala, ‘What is the democracy problem in International Law’ in Sovereignty 
and Multilateralism (2000) 1 Chicago Journal of International Law 401, 409. 
39
 Jan Aart Scholte, ‘Civil society and democratically accountable global governance’ (2004) 
39(2) Government and Opposition 211, 231. 
40
 Magdalena Bexell, Jonas Tallberg and Anders Uhlin, ‘Democracy in Global Governance: 
The promises and pitfalls of transnational actors’ (2010) 16 Global Governance 81-101, 87. 
41
 ibid. 
42
 T Davies, NGOs; A New History of Transnational Civil Society (Hurst, 2013).  
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The extent of the influence of NGOs in international decision-making raises concerns about 
their undemocratic nature. By way of an example, those groups that control the agenda have 
‘control over the scope of the governance system and its ability to change over time’.43 If that 
group is an NGO or group of NGOs, that are not accountable, self-interest or biased agendas 
may dominate.
44
 However, the issue is what democracy means in this context. It has already 
been suggested that NGOs have an inherent tension between democracy and expertise, 
making them susceptible to being labelled undemocratic. The next section will consider the 
meaning of democracy in context, and explore the different models or standards that are 
already present in the approach to NGOs.  
 
3. What is Democracy? 
There is no agreed definition of international democracy.
45
 Usually, a liberal, nation-state 
model of democracy is held up to the international level as a template to follow. Terry 
MacDonald and Kate MacDonald have shown how cosmopolitan democrats have sought to 
replicate ‘some version of the legal and electoral structures that are employed within states’.46 
However, the particularities of international decision-making necessitates an examination of 
democracy. As Murazzini suggested, democratic pluralism can be broken down into firstly, 
internal and external accountability, and secondly, the different models that are discussed at 
the international level; participatory democracy or representative democracy.
47
 The particular 
functions of NGOs in international decision-making requires a discussion on the relation 
between democracy and expertise as well. This particular context of NGOs in international 
decision-making, facilitates a challenge to the prevailing narrative of liberal democracy. 
Before accountability and the models of democracy are discussed, it is useful to recount the 
problems with this progressive narrative of liberal democracy in international law. 
 
The end of the Cold War confirmed, for some, that liberal democracy was the only legitimate 
form of governance. Liberalism in international law gave rise to a drive for democracy and a 
‘“consensus” on the benefits of the rule of law’.48 The emphasis on liberal democracy is 
derived from the Kantian liberal peace, the perceived failure of alternative forms of 
government and the legitimacy that attaches to a liberal democracy. Coupled with the 
evidence that other forms of government failed, a rationale for the call for democracy is the 
increased stability and the promise of international peace.
49
 There is a ‘common belief’ that 
democracy increases ‘prosperity and even quells terrorism’.50 Democracy is rising in 
prominence in international instruments, a few examples include; the Independent Expert on 
the on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order as part of the Human 
                                                          
43
 Bluemel (n 28) 162. 
44
 ibid. 
45
 Same Varayudej, ‘A Right to Democracy in International Law: its implications for Asia’ 
(2006) 12(1) Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 1, 14. 
46
 Terry MacDonald and Kate MacDonald, ‘Non-electoral accountability in Global Politics: 
Strengthening Democratic Control within the Global Garment Industry’ (2006) 17(1) The 
European Journal of International Law 89, 90. 
47
 Murazzani (n 10) 506 
48
 Balakrishnan Rajagopal, ‘Invoking the Rule of Law in post-conflict rebuilding: a critical 
examination’ (2007-2008) 49 William and Mary 1347, 1349. 
49
 E Hay, ‘International(ized) Constitutions and Peacebuilding’ (2014) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 149. 
50
 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Legitimacy of governments in the age of democracy’ (2006) 38 NYU 
Journal of International Law and Politics 878, 885. 
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Rights Council Special Procedures, and the ‘Millennium Development Goals’. Highlighting 
the connection between democracy, human rights and gender equality, as well as the 
consolidation of democracy in Africa to ensure peace, the Millennium Goals show that 
democratic governance has become increasingly intertwined with various international 
projects.
51
 This focus on liberal democracy means that it is not sufficient to be an ‘illiberal’ 
democracy’.52 Democracy and the rule of law have become an international benchmark not 
only for national governance,
53
 but for international law. 
 
The liberalism approach to international law comes with a history of progression or ‘liberal 
millenarism’.54 Francis Fukyama announced that the fall of the Soviet Union was the end of 
history, the only form of government left was liberalism, or the liberal democracy. However, 
there is a problem with these progressive narratives of history. Thomas Franck wrote that the 
eventual victory of democracy was a gradual process,
55
 and yet ‘liberal democracy’ only 
emerged in the 19
th
 Century.
56
 This progressive approach to the history of democracy 
overlooks the centuries of philosophers that criticised democracy for being dangerous.
57
 For 
example, Tocqueville bemoans the ‘election of inferior people to office’.58 Plato in The 
Republic,
59
 and similarly Hegel, argues against democracy. Their complaints focus on the 
lack of ‘coherent unity’ in a democratic, anarchic society and the propensity ‘to follow their 
citizens’ impulses and desires, rather than any concern for the common good.60 Hegel argues 
that it would be better to ‘have those with expertise’.61 The tension between expertise and 
democracy is not, then, a contemporary phenomenon resulting from the technological age.
62
 
Rather, this tension underlies democratic governance, but it becomes more visible in a 
discussion on NGOs because of the joint role they are seen to play. 
 
The absence of a definition of democracy at the international level has given rise to comment 
on whether the liberal model is appropriate. Liberalism in international is not without its 
critics. It has been widely critiqued for being homogeneous. Eriksen criticises the futility of a 
‘one size fits all’ approach that does not take into account the idiosyncrasies of power-sharing 
                                                          
51
 UNGA Resolution 55/2, ‘Millennium Development Goals’, 18 September 2000, UN doc. 
A/RES/55/2 para. 6 and para. 27. 
52
 d’Aspremont (n 50) 879-880. 
53
 Catherine Turner and Ruth Houghton, ‘International Law, Constitution Drafting and Post 
Conflict Reconstruction Policy’ in M Saul and J Sweeney (eds) International Law and Post-
Conflict Reconstruction Policy (forthcoming) 
54
 Susan Marks, ‘The Emerging Norm: Conceptualising Democracy Governance’ (1997) 
ASIL 373, 374. 
55
 T Franck, Fairness in international law and institutions (Clarendon Press 1995) 85. 
56
 Christopher Hobson, ‘Beyond the End of History: The Need for a “Radical Historicisation” 
of democracy in International Relations’ (2009) 37(3) Millennium 631, 639. 
57
 ibid 362. 
58
 See Marc F Plattner, ‘Reflections on Governance’ (2013) Journal of Democracy 17-28, 25. 
59
 See Thom Brooks, ‘Is Plato’s Political Philosophy anti-democratic?’ in Erich Kofmel, Anti-
democratic thought (SCIS, 2008) 117. 
60
 See Simone Chambers, ‘Rhetoric and the Public Sphere: has deliberative democracy 
abandoned mass democracy?’ (2009) Political Theory 323-350, 327. 
61
 Thom Brooks, Hegel’s Political Philosophy: Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of 
Right (Edinburgh University Press 2013) 116. 
62
 Frank Fischer, ‘Professional Expertise in a Deliberative Democracy: Facilitating 
Participatory Inquiry’ (2004) 13(1) The Good Society 21, 21. 
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or local knowledge in the individual state.
63
 Commentators deny the homogeneity of the 
liberal peace, noting that creation of the liberal democratic state has been varied.
64
 These 
criticisms are intensified when the focus shifts from states to non-state actors. Although, the 
liberalisation of international law has cemented liberal democracy as the benchmark, some 
commentators suggest that NGOs should be held to a different standard than states,
65 
that they 
can be ‘measured against different democratic theories and normative ideals’.66 
 
Discourses on NGOs in international decision-making have already adopted a set of 
rhetorical tools to discuss democracy in relation to NGOs. There is an underlying question on 
the tension between functionalism, or expertise, and democracy. In addition, some 
commentators have discussed the paradox between internal and external accountability. 
Others have debated the role of NGOs in participatory democracy because NGOs can, as 
discussed above, facilitate the participation of other non-state actors. Finally, some 
commentators have noted the contested meaning of representation and have sort to explore 
this in contemporary decentralised politics. These four approaches to NGOs and democracy 
will be discussed in turn. It will be apparent that there is a tension between these four 
approaches, a tension that ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 attempted to address and an ongoing 
tension that the UN Committee on NGOs has to manage. 
 
3.1 Functionalism and Democracy 
Firstly, the debate on the tension between democracy and expertise has been long drawn out. 
Scholarship has sought to suggest models that can reconcile the two. J Dewey argued that the 
two could be divided, that experts would ‘identify basic social needs’ and that citizens ‘would 
set a democratic agenda for pursuing them’.67 The problem with separating out the experts 
from the citizens is that it can give rise to ‘a more top-down technocratic form of consultation 
and decision making’.68 An alternative is to merge the two together, through dialogue.69 
Frank Fischer proposed that democracy and expertise could potentially be reconciled through 
a participatory style democracy.
70
 Similarly, Lawrence B Mohr attempts to reconcile 
expertise and democracy through voluntary democracy.
71
 This voluntary model invokes 
compromise, whilst an expert can lead in ways ‘consistent with organizational task 
democracy’ as the others ‘exercised their right under such a democratic system to defer to 
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expertise’,72 this compromise could easily become coercion. This voluntary model is also 
premised on a participatory style democracy, yet, the UN is predicated on a representative 
model of democracy, with states acting as intermediaries.
73
 
 
Willetts, however, suggests that expertise ‘is not necessarily antidemocratic’; rather, 
democracy is undermined if ‘policy networks are limited to “relevant” actors’ such as 
experts.
74
 Willetts is correct to argue that the participation of experts who can inform the 
public is contributing to the debate.
75
 However, as Mohr highlights, expertise and the 
opinions of experts in contemporary society are often accepted without challenge; their 
opinion has the power to drown out the more vulnerable voices.
76
  
 
It has been suggested that functionalism is so far entrenched in the UN as to undermine the 
chances of democracy.
77
 Willetts spots a functionalist approach in the specialist bodies at the 
UN. This functionalist approach, he suggests, is present in the language of expertise used in 
the Cardoso report. The report, he notes, talks of ‘expertise, skills, evidence, knowledge, 
experience, efficiency, independent specialists, mutual learning, and objectivity-and of being 
results-focused, technical and more effective’.78 Arguably, the specialization of different 
tasks has ‘created levels of fragmentation that now make it quite difficult to bring decisions 
under the control of elected representatives’.79  
 
However, in the NGO both functionalism or expertise and democracy collide. Willetts argues 
that ‘democratic pluralism’ is ‘a reason for why NGOs have influence in the UN’ and that 
functionalism, such as expertise, is the tool NGOs need to use to have ‘better chances to 
influence’.80 This suggestion overlooks the ways in which NGOs are classified and selected 
in the ECOSOC procedures. The role of the NGO at the UN is to simultaneously provide 
expertise and to represent interests or facilitate the participation of those usually excluded 
from the decision-making. According to ECOSOC, NGOs have a dual function, they provide 
expert information and advice to the international organisation and they also allow 
representation of ‘important elements of public opinion’.81 The need to balance expertise and 
democracy is more visible in discussions on NGOs at the UN. 
 
3.2 Internal and External accountability 
Secondly, throughout the discourse on the democratic ‘credentials’ of NGOs,82 there is a 
paradox between external and internal accountability. The recognition that state-based 
electoral accountability is not appropriate in the international, decentralised system, has led 
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academics to discuss alternative notions of accountability. However, as noted by MacDonald 
and MacDonald, forms of accountability will differ from those that happen within states.
83
 
MacDonald and MacDonald have posited that it is ‘possible instead to devise certain forms of 
non-electoral democratic accountability’.84 Breaking down the advantages of democratic 
accountability, MacDonald and MacDonald show that transparency and public 
disempowerment are desired traits.
85
 It is possible, therefore, that NGOs could become more 
transparent and as watchdogs, NGOs often perform the task of challenging and therefore 
disempowering public powers. In positing this shift towards non-state accountability, 
MacDonald and MacDonald have not abandoned the internal and external accountability 
paradigm. Enhanced transparency works to increase internal accountability and the act of 
disempowering public powers is a form of external accountability, it results from holding 
those powers to account. 
 
Whilst NGOs have made international institutions ‘more publicly answerable’,86 NGOs 
themselves are not always answerable to the peoples they represent. Backstrand draws on this 
distinction between external and internal accountability to say that ‘External accountability 
means that decision-makers have to justify their action vis-a-vis stakeholders that are affected 
by their decisions.’87 An example of this in practice, she suggests, is the consultations with 
civil society held by The World Bank.
88
 Yet, looking at the role of NGOs, external 
accountability is broader than the international organisation justifying their decision, it 
includes the holding to account of states or international organisations. NGOs through their 
awareness raising, lobbying and implementation roles are playing a part in holding states and 
international organisations accountable. Internal accountability, by contrast, can be described 
as the mechanisms within the NGOs that make it accountable to its members.
89
  
 
This binary distinction between internal and external is not fixed. Rana Lehr-Lehnardt 
collapses the distinction between internal and external accountability when she suggests that 
‘accountability is the responsible representative of issues and problems in the global 
community’.90 Where the representative issues would act to hold to account the states and 
international organisations as a form of external accountability, the pressure to do this 
‘responsibl[ly]’ is a comment on the organisations internal accountability. Yet, even in this 
more closely linked forms of internal and external accountability, both are needed for 
legitimate non-state actors participation in international affairs. When discussing the tension 
between democracy and expertise, Mohr notes that the tension may also be ‘managed by 
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hypocrisy’.91 Hypocrisy, or the incorporation of different organisational processes for the 
internal and the external parts of the organisation, has been developed by Nils Brunsson,
92
 not 
only allows for the reconciliation between democracy and expertise, but it can also be used to 
discuss the tension between internal and external accountability. Hypocrisy would suggest 
that the NGO could play a part in external accountability without being internally 
accountability. Whilst this might happen in practice, the ECOSOC Resolution focuses too 
heavily on internal accountability for hypocrisy to underpin the access of NGOs to the UN.  
 
 
The role of the NGO as watchdog or holding states accountable, is not democratic without 
internal accountability mechanisms being in place within that NGO. The ECOSOC 
procedures, highlighted above and developed further below, focus on the internal 
accountability of the NGOs. States are asked to consider the democratic nature of the 
structures within the organisation.  Less is provided for about the external accountability of 
the NGO, but the documentation from the Committee on NGOs shows that it is the external 
accountability, the ability of the NGO to hold certain states to account, that preoccupies the 
UN Committee on NGOs. 
 
3.3 Participation 
Thirdly, it is often assumed that ‘[p]articipation of a wider range of social and other 
stakeholders interests add to the legitimacy of outcomes’.93 NGOs, it is argued, ‘can open 
political space for social circles’ which means that vulnerable or often excluded groups can 
participate in the decision-making processes.
94
 The question to consider is what is meant by 
participation. Despite the drive for liberal democracy in international law, free and fair 
elections are not a frequent occurrence in the decision-making processes in international 
organisations. The involvement of NGOs at the UN does not include voting.
95
 The lack of 
voting, however, does not mean that the NGOs do not participate, rather it highlights again 
that democratic practice in international decision-making has to be distinguished from 
national practice. Alternatively, participation is akin to discussion, and it has been shown that 
NGOs can participate in the meetings through written submissions and sometimes oral 
statements. The rules on consultative status show that participation can vary according to the 
body or the status granted to the NGO. Participation is used in the rhetoric on NGOs, as UN 
specialised bodies make known their support for the participation of NGOs. For example, UN 
Women state that ‘the active participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is a 
critical element in the work of the Commission on the Status of Women’.96 However, the 
varying degrees of participation and the forbidding of negotiation by NGOs in 1996, which 
severely reduces the influences that NGOs can have in the decision-making processes, shows 
the tension underlying procedures managing access to the UN. Although, as Willett notes, 
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there is a not a clear line between what amounts to negotiation and what does not,
97
 
suggesting that NGOs still have a role to play in negotiating deals, the step to forbid 
negotiation shows the step taken by states to limit the participation of NGOs. 
 
Participation alone is not sufficient to be democratic, it has to be democratic participation. As 
Kal Raustiala highlights, ‘widened participation’ ‘may affirmatively worsen the situation if 
information is asymmetric and participation not balanced’.98At the UN one of the concerns is 
the western bias of NGOs. The richer, more resourced NGOs from Western states are more 
capable of being heard at the UN. Participation, then, is not balanced. However, Kilby argues 
that even ‘participatory democracy has been at the expense of representative democracy’.99 
Using examples from domestic governance, Kilby shows that the participation of more 
resourced NGOs can replace the interests of the citizens as a whole. Similarly, at the 
international level the stronger voices of the Western or larger NGOs might overwhelm the 
less powerful voices. This negative effect on representational democracy, in a broader sense, 
shows the tensions that persist in discussions on the democratic credentials of NGOs. 
 
3.4 Representation 
The final theme is that of representation. Representative democracy, mainstay across the 
democratic states, has ‘become a dominant idea’ in governance.100 The domestic, and 
therefore traditional, way of conceptualising representative democracy is through the free and 
fair election of representatives. Yet, what is meant by representation is contested and the 
definition of representation is ‘hidden behind a cloud of countless definitions’.101 The 
standard definition of representation is ‘to make present what is absent’.102 Yet, this does not 
address what it is that needs to be made present and by whom or how. In addressing the 
whom or how element, Yigit has shown how in the European Union there are examples of 
both direct representation (via the Parliament) and indirect representation (via the Council).
103
 
Although this acknowledges the different sources of representation, it is still premised in 
electoral-based representation. EU citizens elect Members of the European Parliament and 
their domestically elected Ministers represent them in the Council. In contrast, Pollak et al., 
challenge the definition of representation, suggesting that its current form was crafted for a 
‘remarkedly different [political community] from the [current] ones’.104 The shift away from 
monolithic systems, to political systems ‘inhabited by various kind of actors, formal and 
informal ones’, makes ‘elections as the differentia specifica’ no longer ‘a defining criteria for 
political representation’.105 The example of NGOs in international decision-making, noting 
that some commentators have already suggested that a different standard can be applied 
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them,
106
 shows that traditional forms of representation through elections is not appropriate at 
the international level.  
 
Shifting to the international level, there are a number of questions that need to be addressed. 
In contrast to politicians, NGOs might not be an appropriate actor in a representative 
democracy. There is a suggestion that ‘being like the people is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition [and that] representatives also need to act like the people’.107 Often NGOs are not 
like the people, nor do they act like the people, whose interests they represent. However, 
Pollak et al., note that representatives can be selected on the basis of their expertise.
108
 
Indeed, as will be discussed, the ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 places particular emphasis on 
the expertise of NGOs. However, as Willetts has suggested, the balance between 
representation and expertise can err on the side of being undemocratic if it excludes actors. 
Similarly, there is a concern that the interests of some can prevail to the detriment of other, 
more vulnerable interests. This tension between representation and participation has already 
been noted, but it is worth highlighting that the factors of expertise can undermine 
participation from the diversity of NGOs. 
 
The second question to consider is whether representative democracy can overcome the 
accountability gaps. Michael Young in ‘Non-state Actors in the Global Order’ showed how 
he included NGOs in international discussions because he ‘knew that these NGOs and the 
interests they represented were often precluded from participating in internal domestic 
dialogues’.109 Young emphasised representation and participation above internal 
accountability. This shows that there is a divide, similar to that between internal and external 
accountability, between internal and external representation. Internal representation addresses 
whether an NGO represents its members, but external representation is more concerned with 
the breadth of that representation. The ECOSOC Resolution seeks to address both questions 
of representation. Yet, the Committee of NGOs is more preoccupied with ‘external 
representation’ and the activities of NGOs in states.   
 
4. ECOSOC and the United Nations Committee on NGOs 
The discussions on the tensions within discussions on international democracy, and 
democratic theory, have highlighted those themes that run throughout the management of 
NGO participation at the UN. Focusing on the ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 that provides 
for the consultative status of NGOs, these tensions will be addressed. The Resolution, whilst 
acknowledging the different themes, does not adequately engage with the particular tensions 
and overlaps. This allows for the manipulation of the process by the Member States of the 
UN Committee on NGOs. Before addressing internal accountability, participation and 
representation, the provisions of the ECOSOC Resolution will be outlined in detail.   
 
4.1 Access and Participation at the United Nations 
The bodies within the UN have a myriad of processes for providing access to NGOs. 
However, given that many of the bodies mimic or reflect the ECOSOC procedure, the starting 
point for NGOs and access at the UN is the granting of ECOSOC consultative status. A 
subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council, the United Nations Committee on Non-
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governmental organisations, comprises 19 member states that recommend NGOs for 
consultative status. Responding to criticisms of a western bias within the Committee, 
membership is based on equitable geographical distribution.
110
 Nevertheless, as will be 
expanded upon below, the Committee is still shrouded in an undemocratic politicisation.  
 
ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 outlined criteria for the granting of access to NGOs. This 
Resolution attempts to address concerns about the undemocratic nature of NGOs. When the 
Committee on NGOs is selecting, there are a number of principles which should guide them. 
The principles to take into account highlight the importance of representation, for example 
the principles prioritise representation from developing countries and those countries that 
have transitional economies.
111
 The principles also pay attention to the internal democratic 
structures of NGOs. NGOs should have a representative structure, possess accountability 
mechanisms, and they should exercise voting or other appropriate democratic and transparent 
decision-making processes.
112
 These criteria, then, address the paradox of NGOs, by making 
sure that both representation and accountability are considered.  
 
However, in the ECOSOC resolution on the participation of NGOs, there is a tension between 
expertise and representativeness. NGOs are acknowledged not only for their representative 
nature, but also for their expertise.
113
 ‘Competence’ or the ‘representative character’ of an 
NGO is necessary to obtain consultative status.
114
 The Resolution states that; 
‘consultative arrangements are to be made, on the one hand, for the purpose of 
enabling the Council or one of its bodies to secure expert information or advice … 
and, on the other hand, to enable international, regional, subregional and national 
organizations that represent important elements of public opinion to express their 
views.’115 
 
The clash between representation and expertise is seen most clearly in paragraph 5 of the 
Resolution, where the two principles the Committee should take into account when 
considering the application are outlined. Whilst the Committee should ‘ensure, to the extent 
possible, participation of non-governmental organizations from all regions, and particularly 
from developing countries, in order to help achieve a just, balanced, effective and genuine 
involvement of non-governmental organizations from all regions and areas of the world’, the 
Resolution also provides that ‘The Committee shall also pay particular attention to non-
governmental organizations that have special expertise or experience upon which the Council 
may wish to draw.’116 Whereas the inclusion of NGOs from all regions is evocative of 
Willetts’ ‘democratic pluralism’, the focus on expertise limits the types of NGOs that will be 
included in such a ‘pluralism’. 
 
Whereas general observation status applies to those organisations that are more broadly 
representative, special status invokes a special competence.
117
 The number and length of 
written submissions is then limited depending on the nature of the status granted; General 
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status allows 2,000 word submissions and Special status allows only 500 words for 
submissions to the ECOSOC, and 1,500 words to other subsidiary bodies.
118
 Expert groups 
then are granted less space to participate than those broader representative groups. This is 
suggestive of a prioritisation of the representation of interests. The recent decisions by the 
UN Committee on NGOs on NGO consultative status highlight how these tensions between 
expertise, accountability, representation, and participation play out in the questions and 
decisions.  
 
 
4.2 Internal accountability 
Towards the end of January 2014, the United Nations Committee on NGOs met to decide the 
consultative status of some 400 NGOs. Comparing the criteria set out in Resolution 1996/1 
with the questions that are asked by the Committee, shows that there is a lack of emphasis 
placed on the internal accountability of the NGOs by the Committee. 
 
Resolution 1996/31 provides that the NGOs internal governance structure should be 
democratic. The NGO must have ‘a democratically adopted constitution’,119 ‘a representative 
structure’, the NGO must ‘possess appropriate mechanisms of accountability to its members, 
who shall exercise effective control over its policies and actions through the exercise of 
voting rights or other appropriate democratic and transparent decision-making processes’.120   
 
Some of the questions addressed to the organisations attempt to probe the democratic nature 
of these organisations. Relying on resolution 1996/31 and the reference to the democratic 
status of the NGOs and their accountability mechanisms,
121
 some of the questioning from 
states refer to the transparency of the organisations and their funding. The question posed by 
China to Collectif des Familles de Disparu(e) en Algerie (Coalition of Families of the 
Disappeared in Algeria) on why 60 per cent of the organization’s expenditures were for 
administrative purposes, is not a rare type of question. Many states ask organisations to 
provide information about their finances. Concern with the internal accountability 
mechanisms of the NGO can be seen when India ‘asked for clarification about why responses 
to questions posed to the NGO seemed to represent the view of only one person, rather than 
the organization as a whole.’122 The failure to reflect the views of the NGO as a whole, 
suggested that the internal accountability mechanisms or the democratic structure were not 
strong enough. It also highlights, however, the overlap between the concern for internal 
accountability and the internal representative nature of NGOs. The question from the Indian 
representative not only comments on the democratic nature of the NGO, but it also comments 
on the extent of its representation.  
 
However, this overlap between internal accountability and representation is not explicitly 
dealt with in the ECOSOC Resolution. Questions relating to the democratic structure invoke 
a narrow, elections based accountability. It is the rules on types of consultative status where 
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questions of representation arise, yet these are focused on the external representation or the 
extent to which an NGOs work represents a number of countries.   
 
4.3 Participation 
Comparing the ECOSOC resolution with other procedures at the UN, the approach to 
participation by ECOSOC is quite restrictive.
123
  The procedure for membership to the 
Department for Public Information section devoted to NGOs (DPI/NGO) is more lax than the 
ECOSOC procedure. However, the benefits of being a member to the DPI/NGO are less 
desirable. There is an Annual Conference where around 1,500 NGOs take part in discussing a 
topic that is part of the UN agenda, but this connection seems to be a one-way conversation. 
The UN provides access and information to the NGOs so that they can disseminate 
information about the UN to their members, rather than the NGOs being able to disseminate 
information about their specific concerns.  
 
Before 1996 the exclusion of national organisations from consultative status particularly 
disadvantaged Third World NGOs.
124
 The reform of the ECOSOC resolution in 1996 helped 
to address the disadvantaged position of Third World NGOs. One of the debates in the 
academic commentary is over whether ECOSOC includes national NGOs. It is now agreed 
that the 1996 Resolution allows national and regional NGOs to apply for consultative status. 
Eduardo Missoni highlights that the ECOSOC definition of NGOs did not include 
‘international’ NGOs.125 However, the condition that general consultative status NGOs are 
‘representative of major segments of society in a large number of countries in different 
regions of the world’126 can be read to suggest that regional and national NGOs cannot fulfil 
the criteria of general consultative status.
127
 Instead, national NGOs are encouraged to apply 
for special status or Roster status.
128
 Yet, Missoni notes that it was the practice before 1996 to 
classify national NGOs as ‘Category II’.129 The question then is whether this is a change that 
increases participation, or whether this just reflects practice. 
 
Beyond the particulars of the criteria, attendance and participation at United Nations 
conferences by NGOs has increased. Willetts shows that the process has changed from 
invitation to ‘all NGOs recognised by ECOSOC having an automatic right to register’.130 UN 
Conferences now allow ‘other “interested” NGOs’ to apply to attend.131 Since the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, there have been a 
number of attempts to drive reform in the relations between the UN and civil society. In July 
1997, the Secretary-General report, Renewing the UN: A Programme for Reform advocated 
for engagement with civil society.
132
 This report had little impact, and in 2002 another report, 
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Strengthening the UN reiterated the growing importance of NGOs.
133
 Whilst there are a 
number of mechanisms that facilitate engagement with NGOs, such as the NGO Liaison 
Committee (NGLS) or Department of Economic and Social Affairs, NGO Branch (UNDESA 
NGO), the procedure that grants consultative status is still problematic. Prior to these UN led 
mechanisms, as early as 1948 the Conference of NGO in Consultative Status (CONGO) 
aimed to facilitate participation in the UN.
134
 This ‘independent, international, non-profit 
membership association of NGOs’, arranged NGO committees that allowed discussion 
between members and UN officials and agencies.
135
 Membership to CONGO was on the 
basis of consultative status, but NGOs could be associate members if they were associated 
with the UN system.
136
 In addition to these facilitating bodies, one of the ways in which the 
UN attempts to combat the exclusion of Third World NGOs, is to take into account 
‘geographical representation’ when drawing up lists of NGOs that can attend UN 
conferences.
137
 
 
Although symbolically these bodies enhance the visibility of NGOs, there is still the 
procedural bar of the ECOSOC process which is highly politicised, being described as having 
the worst reputation.
138
 There are also other procedural reasons why access or participation at 
the UN is curtailed for NGOs. ISHR have noted the often short deadlines for NGOs to apply 
for accreditation.
139
 This highlights, that despite some improvements in the extent of 
participation allowed by ECOSOC and the modalities of conferences or forums, NGOs still 
have a secondary position. ECOSOC and the UN are not prioritising the participation of 
NGOs, rather than is a biased process of selection. 
 
4.4 Representation 
 
Although the terms of reference for the NGO Committee in Resolution 1996/31 provides 
criteria that should be taken into account when selecting NGOs, the reports from the 
Committee show that states are obstructing the selection of organisations by persistent, and 
irrelevant questioning. Asking questions of NGOs can postpone the application for 
consultative status. The questions permitted by states at the Committee often reflect states’ 
concerns with the ‘interests’ NGOs represent, rather than their internal governance structures. 
Examples from the January 2014 Committee on NGOs, show the preoccupation of states with 
the representative nature of NGOs allows states to control what interests are being 
represented.   
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Questioning from the Committee is heavily politicised. States will often be concerned with 
NGO activities in their own territories. China repeatedly asks NGOs to state their position on 
Tibet or Taiwan. States often ask about the scope of an NGOs work, showing a particular 
interest in the states that NGOs will work in. For example, Cuba asked the Korea Differently 
Abled Federation if it intended to establish a presence there,
140
 and Nicaragua asked Italian 
NGO Casa Generalizia della Societa del Sacro Cuore whether it planned to carry out 
activities in Central America.
141
 The questioning of NGO, the Islamic African Relief Agency 
(IARA) (Sudan), shows the politicisation of the process as the US, Pakistan and Israel debate 
the relevance of the questions being asked. The extent of the politicisation is apparent in the 
questioning of Human Life International on 29
th
 January, when Israel asked for their opinion 
on gay marriage.
142
 The extent to which state interests dominated raises the question of who 
is deciding what a legitimate interest amounts to.  
 
Although Willetts argues that activists are over-exaggerating to suggest that NGOs are 
rejected for political reasons, this undermines the effect of the persistent questions and 
constant delays.
143
 Smaller NGOs cannot afford to keep going through the process and stop 
trying. In any case, the ‘hostility from particular governments’ is sufficient to show that the 
politicised process is undermining any democratic credibility.
144
 This sort of politicisation 
shows the problem that arises if a representative model of democracy is prioritised at the 
expense of the necessary checks on the accountability of participants. It is worth noting, in 
the domestic context, in ancient history, representative government was supposed to prevent 
democracy, by denying the unruly masses direct participation in decision-making.
145
 At the 
contemporary international level the rhetoric of ‘representative’ is being used to exclude 
NGOs.  
 
The current procedures on the participation of NGOs in international decision-making shows 
that focus on representation are dominated by state interests. In the ECOSOC resolution, 
NGOs are acknowledged not only for their representative nature, but also for their expertise. 
However, the ECOSOC procedure overlooks the problem that representation lacks a 
definition. Pollak et al, have shown how to talk of representative ‘assumes that the object of 
representation can be discerned and then represented’.146 Representation, they suggest 
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‘requires simplification’,147 which is further simplified through this process of classification. 
The tension between representation and expertise is evident in the approach taken by the 
committee and the distinction between general and consultative status. As has already been 
shown, general status, applicable to those organisations that are more broadly representative, 
are allowed 2,000 word submissions. Yet, special status NGOs, granted status for their 
special competence,
148
 are allowed only 500 words for submissions to the ECOSOC, and 
1,500 words to other subsidiary bodies.
149
 Expert groups then are granted less space to 
participate than those broader representative groups. This is suggestive of a prioritisation of 
the representation of interests.  
 
 
5. Silencing of NGOs 
Access to the UN, the specialised bodies and other forums is surrounded by a tension that has 
largely been managed in favour of representation. States can control who or what they want 
represented. The power that states wield to exclude NGOs is great and even the discussion on 
access does not highlight the increasingly common practice of silencing NGOs. It has already 
been discussed that NGOs have a secondary status to states. The ECOSOC resolutions 
provides for the suspension for up to three years or withdrawal of NGOs on the basis that 
they have acted against the United Nations Charter, which includes ‘politically motivated acts 
against Member States’. Other criteria for suspension include if the NGO has received 
proceeds from criminal activity, or if for three years the NGO made no contribution to the 
work of the UN or ECOSOC.
150
 Few NGOs have been suspended,
151
 but the threat of 
suspension of an NGO on the basis that it has undertaken ‘politically motivated acts against 
Member States’,152 shows the power of the states over the NGOs. What amounts to a 
politically motivated act is not further defined and is open to abuse by states. 
 
In addition to the ECOSOC procedures, the modalities of various High Development Panel 
sessions highlight this trend to deny participation to NGOs. States have started to introduce a 
‘non-objection’ rule; NGOs are allowed to attend only if no state objects. In October 2013, 
the UNGA, despite wishing to create a participatory procedure for the High Level Dialogue 
on International Migration and Development,
153
 the draft resolution planned only to let 
relevant NGOs with consultative status that states did not object to participate.
154
 Moreover, 
the states do not have to provide reasons for their objection.
155
 Whilst the procedure was 
modified somewhat for the Migration and Development Dialogue, other similar meetings 
have included the same no-objection rule. This steady process of chipping away at the 
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participation of NGOs has been matched by a public display of exclusion at the 25
th
 Human 
Rights Council Session. 
 
As described above, at Human Rights Council session in March 2014) the ability of NGOs to 
participate was restricted. The NGO, International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), made a 
statement at China’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and at the end call for a minute’s 
silence to mark the death of the human rights defender Cao Shunli.
156
 China made a point of 
order, stating that in Resolution A/HRC/RES/5/1, paragraph 31 NGOs are only allowed to 
make ‘general comments’, a moment’s silence would not fall under that remit. The President 
of the Council called for a vote on whether he could postpone his decision, but only 13 states 
voted for allowing ISHR to continue. 20 states supported China and voted against and 12 
abstained. This meant that ISHR were prevented from holding their moment’s silence and the 
President moved onto the next NGO. The silencing of these organisations (especially when 
this is supported by undemocratic states) shows the undemocratic nature of international law 
and suggests that NGOs do have an important function in challenging that undemocratic 
force. It shows the power of states to decide what interests and persons should be represented.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The silencing of NGOs at the Human Rights Council shows the current trend of excluding 
NGOs from international decision-making. Included in processes to help cure the democratic 
deficit, NGOs have facilitated participation, represented vulnerable voices, and held states 
and International Organisations accountable. Yet, this potential democratic force is being 
undermined in a strong undemocratic move by some states.  This silencing is a manifestation 
of the tensional relationship between states and NGOs at the UN. Despite increased 
participation by NGOs over the years, this singles strongly that NGOs are secondary to states. 
 
As gatekeepers of NGO access to the United Nations, states have the ability to exclude NGOs 
according to their own, state, interests. Focusing on the ECOSOC procedures for consultative 
states, this article has shown how an underlying tension between accountability, 
representation, participation and expertise is written into the text of Resolution 1996/31. The 
overlaps between these themes has allowed for Member States to manipulate proceedings to 
exclude those NGOs that are representing interests a state disagrees with. 
 
The particularities of NGOs in international decision-making, the disassociation from a state, 
the inappropriateness of elections, shows that the model of liberal democracy is not plausible 
at the international level. Rather, discussions on NGOs and their democratic credentials have 
highlighted four themes; expertise, accountability, participation and representation. These 
themes, some of which are models of democracy themselves, overlap and are not clearly 
demarcated. It has been shown that there is a tension between certain of these themes, for 
example the irreconcilability of expertise and participation. It was these themes that create the 
puzzle which the ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 had to balance or manage, and it has been 
shown that while the text balances these themes, it does not engage with the overlaps or the 
potential clashes. Instead, these clashes have been manipulated by the United Nations 
Committee on NGOs. Asked to consider questions of accountability and to take into account 
participation, the Committee has focused on representation and more loosely expertise. 
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Focusing on the representative nature of NGOs allows states to manage which interests are 
heard at the UN.  
